What Putin really fears about Ukraine

Vladimir Putin’s demonstrated willingness to use force against Ukraine seems to convince many observers, especially in Moscow, that Russia is back as a great power, but invading a neighbour is unlikely to solve the political problems confronting his authoritarian regime, and will probably make them much worse.

The latest phase in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has generated the worst crisis in relations between Moscow and the West since the Cold War era. The conflict flared in March 2014 after Russia annexed Crimea – the first time borders in Europe had been changed by force since 1945 – and then actively supported armed separatists in the east of Ukraine. It is estimated by the United Nations that more than 14,000 people have been killed in this conflict.

The United States and the European Union responded by applying sanctions to parts of Russia’s financial, energy and military sectors, as well as prominent individuals associated with President Putin’s inner circle.

Yet the Putin regime insisted the West was responsible for the conflict. Among other things, Putin accused the US and its allies of active ‘‘interference in Ukrainian domestic affairs’’, and expanding the Nato alliance in eastern Europe against Russian interests.

Interestingly, a number of diplomats and scholars agreed with his argument. They condemned the Obama administration for not respecting Russia’s great power security interests and accepting Ukraine as a neutral buffer state.

Russia’s intervention in 2014 left Putin’s regime diplomatically isolated in Europe, cost it more than $150 billion in capital flight, and flatlined the Russian economy until late 2016.

Fast forward to the current crisis. Although Moscow has denied it is planning to invade, Putin has said there can only be a diplomatic solution if the US and its allies accept his demands.

Putin wants legal guarantees that Nato deny membership to Ukraine and roll back its military deployments in those 14 central and eastern Europe states that have joined Nato since 1990.

These demands have been rejected by the US and Nato leaders, resulting in a diplomatic stalemate that would seem to increase the prospect of Moscow using what it calls ‘‘technical-military’’ measures in Ukraine.

Fearing a Russian invasion, the US

Department of Defence has put 8500 American troops on standby for possible deployment, while Nato is sending ships and fighter jets to its eastern European member states. In addition, a number of eastern European states, as well as the US and UK, are providing military aid directly to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government.

Furthermore, US President Joe Biden has warned Moscow an invasion would ‘‘change the world’’ and have ‘‘enormous consequences’’ for Putin’s regime.

As before, Putin is blaming Nato enlargement as the central cause, and is citing the Western response as evidence to support its claim that Russia is the target, not the instigator, of aggression.

Some commentators in the US and elsewhere are arguing that, if Russia does invade, it would probably prevail, and therefore the West should negotiate some sort of compromise to avoid a costly and perhaps unwinnable conflict.

But there is little evidence to support Putin’s narrative that the US has been the main driving force behind Nato enlargement in eastern and central Europe.

It is clear the real impetus for Nato expansion has come from the countries of the region, determined to prevent a repeat of the historical pattern of Soviet interference during the Cold War.

Any acceptance of Ukraine as a Russian buffer state will not sit comfortably with the principle of sovereignty and the right of states, whether they be Ukraine or New Zealand, to exercise choice in their security arrangements.

It should not be forgotten Ukraine was fully recognised by Russia as a sovereign and independent state in December 1994, after the Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear weapons. Thus, Putin’s claim that Russian troops have been deployed to deter Nato ‘‘aggression’’ does not appear to be very plausible.

It is more likely that neighbouring Ukraine is viewed as a major political threat to Putin’s authoritarian rule within Russia. After 22 years in power as president or prime minister, Putin has established a governance system in which the leader, his political circle and friendly oligarchs have amassed enormous political and financial power and privileges, and ruthlessly suppressed effective opposition voices in the country.

But the Putin regime remains deeply concerned about the political effects that a closer relationship between the West and the Ukraine would have in Russia.

For all the talk of being a great power, Russia’s economy remains smaller than Italy’s, support among young Russians for imprisoned opposition leader and anticorruption campaigner Alexei Navalny continues to grow, and the Kremlin has been rattled by recent large-scale protests against authoritarian allies in Belarus and Kazakhstan.

Above all, Putin’s intervention in Ukraine since 2014 has failed to block the country’s increasing Western links. His massing of troops along the border looks to be something of a desperate attempt to make Ukraine a firewall against ideas that could challenge his repressive rule.

Robert G. Patman is a Sesquicentennial Distinguished Chair and an international relations specialist at Otago University.